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A Look at the Structural Bank Regulation Initiatives and a 
Discussion over Turkish Banking Sector?1 
Sakarya B.  
 
Abstract 
 
Following the 2007-8 Global Crisis, a significant shift is observed towards the international 
regulatory approach about the banks. Apart from reform efforts from international institutions 
such as the IMF, G20 and BIS, several proposals are set forward in some advanced financial 
systems. Moreover, it is debated that, these so called structural bank reform efforts, also present 
a chance to indirectly solve the issue of “To-big-to-fail” problem, the SIFI-“systemically 
Important Financial Institution” problem by its new title. In this study the fundamental 
characteristics of globally known structural bank reform initiatives are compared and a panel 
data analysis conducted for the Turkish commercial banks for the 2002-2012 period to investigate 
the effect of risk diversification on profitability to test for diversification in bank activities. 
 
Keywords: Structural Reforms in Banking, Turkish Banking Sector. 
 
JEL classification: G21, G01, C23.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
As the first blow of the global financial crisis was trampled, a wave of regulatory reactions 
followed especially for regarding internationally active banks.  This type of behavior is somewhat 
expected if one looks at the history of the evolution of international bank regulations and 
standards. However, this time, the reaction has a wider scope, or a deeper concern to it.  
 
This crisis does not have a single problem bank at its core. Or this time a newer approach 
to make up for capital buffers is not found to be sufficient to handle future possible problems.  
With this crisis, the global consensus identifies the issue to be the “banking business” in general. 
Hence the culprit was hit from many fronts. One may be called the newer capital adequacy front, 
namely Basel-III, the other front is the Systemically Important Financial Institution (SIFI) front. 
The last one is the so called Structural Reform front.  These last two fronts relate to each other in 
a many ways.  The idea behind these two measures are to keep banks simple and plain for 
supervisors to monitor effectively, and keep them small for deposit insurers (or preferably  stake 
holders) to resolve them least costly, and quickly. 
                                                     
 
 
1 The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official 
policy or position of BRSA 
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As financial institutions that are too important to fail (TITF) pose systemic risks, one major 
tool to handle this is the SIFI measure. This measure basically comprises higher loss absorbency 
and increased supervision at its heart. These are rightfully classified as “price-based regulations” 
by Viñals et al (2013). However, placing complex and internationally active banks in to the core 
of the crisis, another reaction initially came from US, in the form of structural constraints on the 
scope of the activities of these institutions (The Volcker Rule).  Eventually, Europe followed this 
initiative with the “The Vickers Report”, and “The Liikanen Report”. Moreover, recently, in 
April, 2013, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) held a high-level roundtable on structural 
banking reform. IMF First Deputy Managing Director David Lipton closed the event by 
underlining the importance of the design of structural measures on national level, which would 
complement the international reform agenda (IMF-PR, 2013).  
 
In this study, a short review about major global structural reform proposals is provided, 
followed by a discussion of these issues regarding the Turkish banking system. Later on a panel 
data analysis conducted for the Turkish commercial banks to investigate the effect of risk 
diversification on profitability to test for diversification in bank activities. The last section of this 
paper is the concluding remarks. 
2. STRUCTURAL REFORM EFFORTS 
The term “structural reform” stems from the intention to (generally) break up the universal 
baking model in to two main lines of business: “commercial” and “investment” banking 
businesses. Thus introducing restrictions on each of this block to “leak” to each others’ financial 
operational.  Thus, via these constraints it is assumed that the systemic risk would be reduced 
significantly.  Moreover, smaller sized banks would be easier to resolve in case of any bankruptcy 
.. 
2.1. The Volcker Rule 
The first effort to bring structural restrictions to banks is “The Volcker Rule”. The Volcker 
Rule is implemented by Title VI of the Dodd-Frank Act and named after the former Federal 
Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker. The Dodd-Frank Act, passed on 21st of June 2010, is also called 
the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.  And the original statement is as follows: 
[…To promote the financial stability of the United States by improving 
accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘‘too big to 
fail’’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect 
consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other 
purposes…] (US Senate, 2010) 
Coming the Act itself, Section no: 619, prohibits proprietary trading and certain 
relationships with hedge funds and private equity funds. Thus prohibiting insured deposit-funded, 
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licensed commercial banks in the United States, or bank holding companies (BHCs) with US 
affiliates: 
 Engaging in “proprietary trading”, 
 Acquiring or retaining any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in a hedge fund 
or private equity fund; and 
 Sponsoring a hedge fund or a private equity fund. 
 
These restrictions draw clear borders between deposit banking and investment banking. 
The goal is to create a sound deposit banking system immune from the diseases of the investment 
banking, where products are complex, leverage is high and risk measurement can be faulty.  
 
While the Volcker Rule draws distinctive lines between activities, there are several 
exceptions to the rule.  For example nonbank financial companies designated by the Council for 
supervision by the Board of Governors would not be subject to this prohibition. The Act provides, 
however, that they could be subject to additional capital requirements for, and additional 
quantitative limits with respect to, the foregoing activities (Sweet and Christiansen, 2013). The 
remaining exceptions mainly comprise activities related to transactions of securities which are 
critical to US financial and housing market (such as debt instruments issued by Fannie Mae or 
Freddie Mac), and transactions related to market fundamentals, such as market making and 
hedging activities. 
 
Gambacorta and Van Rixtel (2013) list these exceptions in a very clear fashion as follows:  
 Transactions involving bank-eligible securities  
 Transactions in connection with underwriting or market-making activities in response to 
client/counterparty demand. 
 Hedge transactions. 
 When acting as agent for customers. 
 Transactions in connection with securitisation or sale of loans. 
 Proprietary trading conducted by non-US subsidiaries or branches of non-US banks or 
BHCs . 
 
These restrictions are also valid for ownership, and investment of such entities in the other 
type of institution.  Also it prevents sponsorship of, entities that could expose firms to similar 
risks.   
 
Even with all the exceptions that the Volcker Rule carries, this act brings a distinct 
separation between deposit banking and investment banking. And the act is of the pieces that 
attempts to end “too-big-to-fail” issue for the US system.  
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As the “big” banks offer diverse and cross-border activities, the regulatory reform efforts 
such as “The Volcker Rule”, has its ramification in other areas of similar financial depth.  Hence, 
while in November 2010, Basel III was endorsed by G20 leaders at the Seoul summit, and there 
will be a phased implementation with full application in 2019, in June 2012, the UK Government 
published a white paper describing the current coalition’s legislative reactions to the 
recommendations of the Vickers Report (HM Treasury, 2012). 
2.2.  The Vickers Report 
The financial reform in UK has two main pillars. The first pillar of this program, reform of 
financial services regulation, has been legislated in the Financial Services Act of 2012. The 
second key pillar of the UK Government’s program for reform of the financial sector, following 
the financial crisis of 2007-09, is the component titled “Banking Reform”. This initiative has the 
recommendations of the Independent Commission on Banking (ICB), at its core. And this is called 
The Vickers Commission Proposals and/or The Vickers Report. 
 
The Vickers Commission proposals have a broader scope than the Volcker Rule, and uses 
“ring fencing” to achieve its goals. Report states its aim as “…to create a more stable and 
competitive basis for UK banking in the longer term. That means much more than greater 
resilience against future financial crises and removing risks from banks to the public finances. It 
also means a banking system that is effective and efficient at providing the basic banking services 
of safeguarding retail deposits, operating secure payments systems, efficiently channelling 
savings to productive investments, and managing financial risk…..”(ICB, 2011:7). 
 
The proposal has a main purpose to end universal banking and require retail banking and 
wholesale and investment banking to be carried out by separate banks. By this, the taxpayers 
would be isolated by the risks transmitted from the financial activities of global wholesale and 
investment banking. It is clear that the main idea behind the Volcker Rule and the Vickers Report 
is fully in line.   However the tools and restrictions used to detach retail banking and wholesale 
banking.  The proposal structures its action plan on estimation of systemically important banks. 
These banks should have an equity ratio of at least 10% provided that they also have genuinely 
loss-absorbing debt (ICB, 2011, Vickers, 2012). Then we see the retail “ring-fence”. Which is, 
each banking group would be required to “ring-fence” critical banking services whose temporary 
interruption would have a systemic ramification. The ring fencing means that the bank would 
have to break up as a different legal entity from its wholesale body, with a totally different set of 
decision making ensemble.  
 
This ring fencing has two dimensions as Gambacorta and Van Rixtel (2013) points out. 
One is the “location” the other is the “depth” of a given bank. The location simply refers to the 
actual entity that a given financial transaction is allowed to be conducted by.  the What type of 
financial transactions can be done in retail banking and what type of products are going to be left 
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out to the wholesale banking would be the appropriate questions. And then once these two are 
separated, what type of financial relation between these two sets of financial institutions are going 
to be permitted? That would be the “depth” problem.  
 
Coming to the first set of issues, UK Government proposal asks certain financial services 
to be provided by a ring-fenced entity i.e. the retail entity which is protected from international 
wholesale banking. These services are basic retail banking services regarding the financial 
intermediation role of a deposit bank has.  The Report suggests containing all deposits from 
individuals and SMEs. The activities that the protected or ring fenced bank is prohibited to engage 
in trading or other investment banking activities, provide services to financial companies, or 
services to customers outside the EEA (Edmonds, 2013). Within these constraints, the ring fenced 
entity is allowed to take deposits from larger companies and provide non-financial larger 
companies with other intermediation services such as simple loans. 
 
The proposal uses a distinct set of financial services sets. These are mandated services, 
prohibited services and ancillary services. Mandated services are the financial services that only 
retail banks i.e. ring fenced banks may provide, where any disruption of such services would 
create systemic effects, regarding a wider range of population. Prohibited services are the services 
that these protected banks are not allowed to commence and these include complex financial 
instruments, and services that would expose these ring fenced banks to global financial market 
fluctuations.  
2.3. The Liikanen Report 
A High-level Expert Group on structural bank reforms was formed by European 
Commission in February 2012. This Commission chaired by Erkki Liikanen, hence the Final 
Report of the Commission is called The Liikanen Report. This Report basically assesses the need 
for structural reforms in the EU regarding the banking sector and makes relevant proposals. The 
objective, like other initiatives, focuses the financial stability concerns with establishment of an 
efficient banking system serving the needs of citizens. 
 
The Report claims that it is necessary to require legal separation of certain particularly risky 
financial activities from deposit-taking banks within the banking group. Once more the reasoning, 
the central objective of the separation is to make banking groups, especially their deposit-taking 
and real financial intermediary parts safer and less connected to trading activities. Thus, limiting 
the implicit or explicit costs to taxpayers that may be transmitted from the trading parts of 
(universal) banking groups.  
And there are five measures; (1) proprietary trading and other significant trading activities 
should be assigned to a separate legal entity given that the activities to be separated exceed 
threshold (a significant share of a bank's business)-however the banking group still can live as a 
group-, (2) bank are obliged to provide a convincing recovery and resolution plan for their deposit 
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taking business conducts –the relevant authority would asses this plan-, (3) Banks should  
structure their liabilities that would imply an effective bail-in procedure, (4) higher standards for 
capital adequacy measurement –meaning robust risk weights and better internal models-, and (5) 
better corporate governance for the separated sections of the business conduct. 
 
The mandatory separation is valid, if a bank’s assets held for trading and available for sale, 
exceed a threshold of 15-25% of the bank’s total assets or an absolute threshold of 100 billion Euros. 
This brings the bank to the next stage where, supervisors suppose to determine the need for separation 
based on the share of assets to which the separation requirement would apply. Once a bank exceeds 
these limits, all the related financial activity is to be transferred to a legally-separate trading entity –
however, this new entity may live under the same banking group- . Moreover, this banking group (i.e.  
the group also has a deposit bank unit) must provide that the deposit banking business is well protected 
from the activities of the remaining financial bodies. 
One other important issue that the Report draws attention is that each individual entity with 
in a banking group, namely the trading bank part and the deposit bank part are individually subject 
to the regulatory requirements, such as the CRR/CRDIV and consolidated supervision, which 
pertain to EU financial institutions.  According to the Report this is a must to ensure the resilience 
of the two types of entities (Liikanen et al, 2012). 
 
Apart from the separation of the activities there are also issues regarding the regulation and 
resolution.  These issues fall beyond the scope of this study, but, the proposals regarding the 
resolution reflects, and supports the philosophy behind the structural reform efforts. These 
proposals in general focus on minimization of public costs, with an emphasis on bail-ins. 
 
Table 1: Advantages and Disadvantages of Structural Reform Efforts 
Advantages Disadvantages 
1) Lowers complexity, increasing effectiveness of price-
based tools 
1a)Complexity: (simpler banks after separation)  
1b)Interconnectedness: (contagion og risks from trading 
to deposit line is limited) 
1) Implemantion Costs  
1a) Misclassification of prohibited activities 
1b) Adjustment costs of the institutions 
1c) Increased costs of supervision 
2)Improving resolution: (lowered cost, simpler process) 2) Risk migration  
2a) Shadow banking 
2b) Exempt institutions 
2c) Cross border issues (flights) 
 3) Market liquidity and borrowing costs 
3a) Impact on trading and market making 
3b)Increased costs on alternative instruments,  
 4) Lower diversification benefits 
Loss of returns from economies of scope 
Source: (Vinals et al 2013and the author) 
 
Looking at these major approaches to two main issues come to surface. First off can they 
help to solve to problem of too-big-to-fail, and the follow up issues like resolution. Second can 
they provide a more efficient banking (financial system), regardless of the first problematic.  
 
EY International Congress on Economics I 
"Europe and Global Economic Rebalancing” 
October 24-25, 2013, Ankara/Turkey 
Page 7 of 15 
Still the follow up issues such as the cross-border implications, international regulation and 
cross border resolution remain way to elaborate to tackle as of present international state. 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of suggested structural reforms 
 
Source: Liikanen (2013) 
3. STRUCTURAL REFORMS AND TURKISH BANKING SYSTEM 
When evaluating the Turkish banking system with this structural reform framework, one 
needs to keep in mind that these efforts are originating from global financial centres. These centres 
can also be coined as “systemically important economies” considering the global financial 
stability and soundness. However this does not necessarily implies that these issues are to be 
overlooked for emerging economies. As all SIFI and G-SIFI issues spread to a wider base, and 
has domestic considerations, the structural reforms may also have similar implications. 
Nevertheless when conducting a cost-benefit analysis for these efforts, it is obvious that the 
positive externalities brought from reforms in the global financial centres will be much more. 
 
In Table 2, the major activities subject to licensing from the regulatory and supervisory 
authority is listed. By the article 4 of the Banking Law Nr. 5411, main activities of banks may 
carry out are stipulated by function groups. The most significant division is observed at accepting 
deposit, accepting participation funds and financial leasing transactions.   
 
 
 
Proprietary trading,
Hedge fund (HF) and Private 
equity (PE) exposures
Market making
Proprietary trading, 
market making, 
investment banking incl. 
securities underwriting 
and commercial banking
“Volcker banking group”
“Vickers banking group”
“Liikanen (HLEG) banking group”
Investment, 
commercial and 
retail banking
Proprietary trading, 
market making and 
HF, PE and SIV
unsecured
exposures
Investment banking 
incl. securities 
underwriting, 
commercial and 
retail banking
Swaps push-out
Retail
banking with
higher capital
requirements
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Table 2: Main Activities Subject to Banking License by Bank Type in Turkey 
  
Deposit 
 Bank 
Participation 
 Bank 
Dev. & 
Inves. 
Bank 
B
an
k
in
g
 T
ra
n
sa
ct
io
n
s 
 
Accepting deposits  √   
Accepting participation fund   √  
Extending loan transactions  √ √ √ 
Payment, fund transfer and collection of revenues  √ √ √ 
Purchase of bills of Exchange  √ √ √ 
Storage services  √ √ √ 
Transactions concerning payment instruments  √ √ √ 
FX transactions; Money market instruments,  
precious metal purchase, sale, safekeeping 
√ √ √ 
Guarantee operations √ √ √ 
Intermediation to Money purchase and sale  
transactions in interbank market  
√ √ √ 
C
ap
it
al
 M
ar
k
et
s 
T
ra
n
sa
ct
io
n
s 
 
Purchase, sale and intermediation of futures and option contracts,  
financial instruments  
√* √ √ 
Purchase and sale and promise to re-purchase of re-sale of  
capital markets instruments  
√* √ √* 
Intermediation transactions to sale of capital markets  
instruments by issuing or public offering  
√ √ √* 
Intermediation transactions to purchase and sale of  
issued capital markets instruments  
√* √ √* 
Investment consultation transactions √ √ √* 
Portfolio operation and management  √ √ √* 
Market maker √ √ √ 
Safekeeping services  √ √ √ 
In
su
ra
n
ce
 
T
ra
n
sa
ct
io
n
s 
Insurance agent and individual pension intermediary services √ √ √ 
O
th
er
  
Factoring  and forfeiting transactions  √ √ √ 
Financial leasing transactions  √ √ 
*: Not all banks have the relative license 
Source: BRSA (2011) 
 
While the deposit banks are authorized to accept deposit and extend loans, participation 
banks are authorized to collect funds by special and participation accounts and extend loans. 
Development and investment banks can extend loans but cannot accept deposits or participation 
funds. One other significant division is that the deposits banks cannot perform leasing 
transactions. However these banks a dominant in capital markets transactions and services related 
to these financial instruments. Hence in a bank dominated financial system, a deposit bank 
dominated sector is observed. 
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Thus, while considering such measures for economies like Turkey, it is best to confer that 
the price based measures yield expected results dealing with large financial institutions, which 
are deposit banks. For example the macro prudential policy measures taken since the global crisis, 
proved to be quite successful in Turkish banking system.  
 
One other issue is the incentive scheme present in the market should correspond with the 
current regulations. As the major hurdle for developing domestic financial markets, the regulatory 
arbitrage and shadow banking is a major concern. 
 
However, these structural reforms convey also major benefits for emerging economies.  
First of all a proper separation may bring an uninterrupted conventional financial service to 
household and corporate sector. Thus, the cost of a possible failure to the public finance may also 
be limited with a size and/or activity constraints.  
 
Another issue arises from the cross border banking activities. Since these reforms are well 
on way for developed financial centres, ne significant disadvantage for these centres could 
generate opportunities for developing financial centres. The activity limitations within these 
centres may also induce a flight of complex banking activities to other (emerging) financial 
systems. This might be a particularly important matter for Istanbul Financial Centre project, 
providing an efficient and acknowledged supervisory framework. 
 
Apart from the cost benefit analysis built upon a possible bank failure and resolution, there 
exists another aspect of the structural reform discussion. That is the possible effects of the 
structural breakup on banks’ business conduct. Regardless of big bank resolution and costs to 
public finance, there is an issue of banks loosing advantages of economies of scale and scope. 
This issue perhaps should play a greater part especially dealing with developing banking systems 
where financial depth and inclusion are still on the agenda. Hence in the next section an empirical 
analysis is presented to try to identify the limits of returns from activity diversification  of the 
Turkish banking system.  
4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
In this study, apart from the overall discussion of structural reform proposals and their 
possible reflections on Turkish banking sector, the relationship between the diversification ratio 
and bank profitability is analyzed through a non linear structure. A broader implication of this 
analysis has been conducted by Gambacorta and Van Rixtel (2013) by constructing a non linear 
model utilizing a diversification definition regressed over a bank profitability measure. A proxy 
for product differentiation as the ratio of non-interest income (trade revenues, fees and 
commissions for services) to total income is utilized. Then return on equity is regressed over this 
diversification parameter in a non linear fashion also using several macroeconomic indicators to 
take account for country specific conditions. Moving from the same vein of analysis, in this study, 
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return on assets as well as return on equity is regressed over a proxy variable to represent 
diversification for a given bank. The return on assets is considered as a more relevant indicator of 
profitability regarding the size of a financial institution. Apart from the addition this variable an 
interacting dummy variable for large scale banks is also tested. 
 
The size, scale, and scope issues in banking are a vast area. There are many proponents of 
diversification and benefits of utilizing the economies of scope in banking most recently studies 
such as Lown et al (2000) , Yu and Neus (2005), Allen and Liu (2007) and . At the same time 
Klein and Saidenberg (2008) provides econometric evidence for adverse effect of diversification 
on bank holding companies.  
  
The data covers 39 banks over a period of 11 years, spanning 2002 to 2012. The summary 
statistics are provided below. 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics for the Variables  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
divr 350 0.1958414 0.1143498 -0.8486 0.8229 
roa 350 0.0197154 0.0540361 -0.6324 0.2272 
roe 350 0.1291609 0.2370803 -1.8886 0.5449 
 
The representative estimated equation is as below: 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅𝑖,𝑡
2 + [𝛿𝐷𝑈𝑀𝐵.𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅2] + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                (1) 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅𝑖,𝑡
2 + [𝛿𝐷𝑈𝑀𝐵. 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅2] + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                (2) 
 
The terms in parenthesis are added for large scale bank consideration as an alternative 
augmentation on simple versions.  
 
When the estimation outputs are analyzed, It is expected the linear relationship between 
profitability and diversification would be positive. The non linear part of the equation is of 
importance. Hence, it is seen that the non-linear portion of the equation, which is DIVR2 is 
significant and negative. However, the main problem for the Turkish case is that the size of this 
coefficient is larger than expected. This makes the diversification issue a problem for almost any 
firm. Thus, as mentioned before, another term for large scale banks is introduced to correct for 
this problem. Looking at this variable, it is found to be significant for return on equity. This 
interaction variable is expected to be insignificant for the equation on return of assets, as ROA 
has some sort of a clustering regarding the bank scale.  
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Table 4: Summary Statistics for the Equations 
   ROE 
  Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
divr 0.308 2.420 0.016 0.262 2.040 0.042 
divrsq -0.666 -3.270 0.001 -0.710 -3.480 0.001 
dumbdivsq    3.188 2.100 0.036 
id_cons 0.103 3.800 0.000 0.089 3.210 0.001 
R2 0.442   0.450   
  ROA 
  Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
divr 0.221 10.670 0.000 0.219 10.400 0.000 
divrsq -0.410 -12.390 0.000 -0.413 -12.380 0.000 
dumbdivsq    0.166 0.670 0.505 
id_cons -0.002 -0.560 0.575 -0.003 -0.700 0.481 
R2 0.716   0.717   
 
The results obtained from these equations are in line with the findings of by Gambacorta 
and Van Rixtel (2013). It should be noted that even the results indicate a decrease in returns from 
increased diversification, which does not imply a certain threshold regarding the size of a given 
bank. Moreover, most recent studies cannot exactly pinpoint the net benefits (or costs) of activity 
and for those matter size restrictions. Thus the size thresholds for bank assets, vary from 100 
billion USD to 1 trillion USD (Wheelock and Wilson, 2011). 
 
One major short coming of the application is, the lack activity based testing rather than use 
of a proxy for this issue. The available data does not allow for such modelling, which makes it 
impossible to distinguish between a significant and an economically reasonable separation of 
activities.  
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The global financial crisis and the public costs from the crisis ultimately labelled 
characterized the big banks as the culprits. While the issues of too-big-to-fail, re emerged in the 
form of “systemically important banks”, another aspect of breaking-up came from the structural 
side. The reasoning is quite simple, there is a “good” banking, which is the traditional depositor 
to lender type financial intermediation banking, and there is the “bad” banking, which is the 
wholesale, investment banking filled up with complex instruments where risk measurement is 
blurry.  
 
Hence major proposals emerged to break up the “bad” from the “good” banking. However, 
these major financial centres were the ones who endorsed scale and scope economics in the 
financial system, and rooted for advanced risk measurement techniques. So, one should try to be 
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clear about whether is this pendulum of regulation is a short one or not, before going out and 
implementing them.  
 
Moreover, IMF (2013) in its Financial Sector Assessment Program report of the EU raises 
a question on the first issue stating that, “...separation of banking activities would not have helped 
address some of the most serious problems of the crisis. Lehman Brothers, for example, was not 
a retail deposit taking institution. Also, many banking sector difficulties derived from the “plain 
vanilla” side of the bank, most particularly lending for residential real estate..”. So a separation 
of bank activities might only bring size constraints to reduce too-big-to-fail issue. The removal of 
the interconnectedness and complexity issues might not be sufficient to solve the too-big-to-fail 
(SIFI) problem. In defence of this argument, the most recent European banking woes originates 
from a single and not much of a complex source, EU public debt management. 
 
Still bank executives frequently cite the attainment of scale economies as an important 
reason for bank mergers and acquisitions (Weelock and Wilson, 2011). European Banking 
Federation  claims that strengthening the use of Recovery and Resolution Plans (RRP) as 
recommended in the HLEG’s avenue 1 (where additional capital surcharges are introduced as 
price based tools) fits better with the regulatory reform agenda and will have considerable less 
distortive impact (EBF, 2013).  
 
So the discussion over the banking systems structural separation seems to be a conundrum. 
Looking at this issue from the Turkish banking case, while we observe a decreasing return on 
diversification, the size and scale issue remains as a challenge as, there are problems of financial 
depth and inclusion.  As Haldane (2010), executive director for financial stability in Bank of 
England points out“..The essence of these arguments is that limits on the optimal size and scope 
of firms may be as much neurological as technological” (Heldane, 2010). 
 
Further studies of such should include a distinction between bank operations and net 
income generated from these lines of businesses. That would help any policy maker to answer the 
structural break issue. Additionally, this would definitely help deciding the ways to go with the 
style of structural break, such as plain ring fencing, absolute separation.  
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